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ABSTRACT

ethical research and reflection.

Over the last year, fierce discussion have raged

DESIGN AS A FRONT ENGAGEMENT

about the trend of socially engaged design, where

The connection between design and the military
industrial complex has a long history and most
designers know the history of Ferdinand Porsche’s
design of German tanks in World War II as well as
Hugo Boss’ design of Nazi uniforms. In a similar vain,
today no Italian soldier today would enter war in
anything else than a uniform designed by Georgio
Armani.

such projects have been scolded as new forms of
“design imperialism” (cf. Nussbaum 2010; Pilloton
2010; Sinclair 2010). Resonating with this
discussion, the latest US Army Field Manual has
included “design” as a central feature in the core
battle doctrine. Are we seeing the birth of a “social
design doctrine” employed to wage war?
It is tempting to draw parallels between design and
the developments of military thinking to reflect
some of the issues at stake as design turns to
address social, cultural and ethnic issues. As its
point of departure this text examines how design
and warfare strive for opening new “fronts” in
conflicts, new dimensions to strike the enemy, and
also use games to train and expand tactical
thinking. Today, trans-disciplinary “Human
Terrain Teams” of ethnographers, anthropologists
and military personnel are engaged in
counterinsurgency warfare. Similar to the latest
doctrines of warfare, design explores the use of
interfaces, fronts and conflict zones, and social
design might soon be the next social “surrogate
warfare”. As design goes social it urgently needs
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As highlighted by Adrian Forty in his celebrated book
Objects of Desire, design has always run the errands of
power, legitimizing power and the formation of human
subjects by desire, force and influence (Forty 1986).
Capital, in Forty’s case first exemplified by
Wedgewood porcelain, used designers in an
instrumental way to integrate fast and streamlined
methods for mass production, often against the will of
the workers, which satisfied the taste of the market
(Forty 1986; 29ff).
Much of design consists of shaping surfaces, façades or
interfaces. Design concerns the front. It is a front as in
an outer shell, the look or interface, but it is also a front
in the meaning of a conflict zone. Indeed, one could say
that design is a weapon in an arms race where we
designers are the warmongers. Let’s examine how.
The designed interface is a conflict, or perhaps even a
battle zone. It is a territory split between two or more
conflicting wills. Take for example clothes, the outer
surface of our dressed body. My clothes are a
battlefield, a conflict engaging my will of expression
and the intentions of the designer, but also, as Dick
Hebdige pointed out in his seminal Subculture, the
Meaning of Style, the symbolic tactics of subculture
(Hebdige 1979). As Hebdige points out, I am a victim,
but also a irregular fighter, caught in the frontline in a
war of codes and meaning.
I also encounter the fronts at the war of everyday
undertakings as I struggle against “affordances”. I fight
with getting the pram up the stairs. I fight with the
sensor registering movement to open the automatic
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doors. Especially interaction design provokes conflict:
everyday I wrestle with Microsoft Word. And it really
fights back. For example; I try to write some abstract
Dadaist poetry, and Word counterattacks by correcting
my spelling. I erase and rewrite. Word retaliates and
underlines my words in red, blood red.
This behaviour of Word is a typical counterinsurgency
tactic created by interaction designers, and we can see it
everywhere: the pre-programmed “correct behaviours”
firing back at us innocent users. This unjust battle
recruits honest users to become guerrilla fighters in an
asymmetric war of interactions. Most of us only want
peace, but the front calls us. We desperately seek a
diplomatic solution in the preferences menu, trying to
stop some corrective grammar function, but most often
to no avail.
The struggle with Word is similar to what the influential
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz called the
“friction” of war; the complexity of battle as
unpredictable events evolve and the “fog of war”
increases. To Clausewitz "friction" is the "factors that
distinguish real war from war on paper." (Clausewitz
2008: 83) Due to friction "the light of reason is refracted
in a manner quite different from that which is normal in
academic speculation." (77) The struggle for military
command is to make sense of the information from the
battlefield and make wise moves. In a similar vain,
designers try to reduce the “friction” of use, by “userfriendliness” or “form-follows-function”.

A BRIEF GEOMETRIC HISTORY OF THE
FRONT
With a quick look at the history of warfare we can
easily draw parallels the evolution of design. It seems
like war, just like design, is always fighting for new
dimensions to open new fronts. The different geometries
and dimensions do not follow a strict historical
evolution, as they reach different intensities at different
times, but a rough generalization can be made to
highlight the “abstract thinking” of each war era. To use
deleuzoguattarian terminology, the battlefields were
“smooth” or “striated” at various points in time and in
different dimensions (Deleuze & Guattari 2004). The
opposing “war machines” tried to open new smooth
dimensions to cut decisive blows into the enemy’s
striated defences.
Primitive battles were non-dimensional, it is the zerodegree of battle. Nomadic clans of hunter-gatherers
move around in a smooth space and wage battle when
accidentally set against a foe. But with specialization
war could be waged more accurately and deadly.
Battles in classical and medieval times were about
points and specific battlefields. Generals assigned
places for battle, almost like duels, and forts or castles
could be besieged. This was the one-dimensional war;
combat was done at specific geometric points. However,
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the tactics were linear and geometric, as the commander
would manoeuvre various formations of soldiers into
positions where the weapons would have the greatest
effect on the enemy.
During World War I the points get extended into a
second dimension and heavily defended and entrenched
lines become drawn across the landscape. The aim of
warfare was to seize and hold territory, preferably
sacking the capital, or to destroy the opposing army
through attrition. Especially at the western front, the war
got pinned in two-dimensional contours dug into the
soil, where armies had to conduct offensive operations
on a single continuous front. This is the zenith of linear
tactics.
For any success in a WWI offensive, it had to be
meticulously organized and methodical as the advance
of infantry depended the artillery fire. Creeping
barrage, or rolling curtains of fire, preceded attacking
infantry lines according to pre-established timetables.
Even if an attack succeeded and sudden breakthrough
was achieved in the first lines of trenches, the infantry
could not advance further into enemy territory as
moving on without artillery cover would be too costly.
The problem was to move the heavy line of artillery
through the landscape it, just moments before, so
successfully had turned into a moon landscape of mud
(Wiest & Barbier 2002).
In the WWI stalemate it required the invention of new
dimensions of warfare; armed airplanes (to fly over the
enemy trenches) and tunnel warfare (to dig and plant
bombs under the enemy trenches). Thus to avoid the
stagnated line the war became three-dimensional.
However, the WWI also saw the birth of infiltration
tactics, especially associated by the “Hutier” tactics
(after the German inventor, General Oscar Hutier) and
the use of Stosstruppen (Storm troops). This approach
tried to break the lines by concentrated fire, dodgy
manoeuvres and combined arms. Hutier also made
efforts to put command together with the infiltrating
troops to better use the breakthroughs. Efforts like this
formed the embryo for the German Auftragstaktik, or
mission-oriented tactics, a keystone of the mechanized
manoeuvre warfare actualized twenty years later. The
Hutier tactics, while still using infantry troops and
equipment, differed from the pervious linear approach
of mass assault,
Once located, the troops could use their own
weaponry to achieve a breech in the line, with the
goal of advancing to tactical depth. No longer was it
necessary to attempt to overthrow the entire enemy
defensive system utilizing the brute force of great
numbers. The quickly advancing storm troops would
attempt to disrupt the enemy defensive system by
striking at supporting artillery and command centres.
In many ways the style of warfare was Blitzkrieg
without tanks. The enemy defences were now seen
as a system. It was the job of the storm troops to
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short-circuit the brain of the system rather than
batter the body. (Wiest & Barbier 2002: 20)
As a form of appropriation the storm troopers “hacked”
into the system of the enemy, used the dug
infrastructure as a diagonal vector to cut deep into
enemy territory and deployed forces. While still fighting
on a two-dimensional surface, the Hutier tactics aimed
at using the striated battlefield to their advantage.
By World War II the industrial paradigm of warfare
reached its peak with technical warfare happening on
land, at sea and in the air and in all three dimensions.
This was the last great war between equally modern
states and where the machines of mass production kept
the war going until they finally broke down in a “total
war”.
Today the ends in armed conflicts are often unclear, and
the means are constantly changing. In most
contemporary conflicts there is a multitude of political,
economic and ethnic ingredients. Conflicts erupt at
some places around the planet while the rest of the
planet lives in a constant threat, of terrorism, bombs or
other forms of violence. New frontiers and dimensions
also open in new densities; nuclear war, cyber-war, biowar, civilization-wars. The fronts dissolve into a
continuous blur of constant insecurity and risk, as
enemies seem to be everywhere and nowhere.
Except trying to outflank the opponent by new
dimensions, war is a question of speed. Castles and
bunkers are about digging down to stop time and petrify
time and the opponent, to keep a status quo (Virilo
1995). Not too unlike copyrights or the blocking of
access to Internet sites to strike down on protests
(Kullenberg 2010). But new techniques are invented to
fly over the fortifications, to increase the speed, to dig
encrypted tunnels for dissident transmissions and
circumvent the defences. Think of rockets, bitTorrent
protocols for file-sharing, openDNS or cipher-hackers
supporting protesting students in Iran or northern
Africa.
Indeed, we can recognize the same patterns if we reexamine design, for example fashion design. Once the
struggle was about the dominance of one frontline; the
meaning exposed at the surface of the garment. The
designer had an intention, a proposed meaning, and the
user could choose to wear and identify with this
meaning (Barthes 1983). But subcultures came to
undermine this meaning. The denim jeans of the US
miners were worn by artists and rebels and became
ubiquitous fashion. Over the years some ethnic
garments become guerrilla statements; some colours
become loaded with explosive meaning (Barnard 1996).
Today fashion has so many fronts and meanings the
voice of the designer is almost unheard among all
magazines, blogs and forums. And not only meaning or
identity; today the fashion fronts cut through ecological
materials, ethical production, chemicals of various sorts,
new fibres, composting and cradle to cradle product
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service systems. Marketing gurus look for even more
dimensions; every brand wants a break through. Fashion
design seems impossible to overview, ends and means
mixed, all styles coexist at the same time and only a
fragment seems to be about the clothes themselves.
How did we get here, and how did the military respond
to the growing complexity of their battle operations?

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY
THINKING; FROM ENGINEERING TO
COMPLEXITY
As elaborated on by theorist Antoine Bourquet, military
development of doctrine follows overall scientific
discoveries and discourse, affecting strategies and
tactics as well as military theory in general (Bourquet
2009). The clockwork armies of Frederick the Great
were later replaced by the thermodynamic order or
industrial motor armies, striving for density, mobility
and firepower, coming to the German Blitzkrieg of
World War II. To reach maximum effect on the steel
density of tank armies, control was moved to the front,
as in the German Auftragstaktik (mission-oriented
tactics) or, as discussed by military theorist and general
Shimon Naveh, in the Soviet doctrine of “deep battle”
(Naveh 2006).
To Naveh, the manoeuvre in industrial warfare follows
certain engineering logics. The overall logic is of
striking with force at the weak parts of the enemy; in the
middle-lines, communications and vectors of
movement, aiming at a deep breakthrough to eliminate
the enemy force with high-density firepower and a
density of mass. Such tactics, or fire and movement,
following Euclidean geometry, works towards creating
operational shock, preferably simultaneously throughout
the enemy force. According to Naveh, this traditional
manoeuvre paradigm saw its eclipse in the Soviet
Operation Bagration in 1944, which lead to the
destruction of German army group centre and the final
loss of German strategic advantage on the eastern front
(Naveh 2006).
The current order of modern warfare, for example in the
US and Swedish armies, called “Network Centric
Warfare”, follows developments in information
technology, computers, surveillance and satellite
communication (cf Albers, Gerstka & Stein 1999).
Using technology to reduce the “fog-of-war” on the
battlefield this information driven warfare is designed to
thrive on the chaos of war. However, these doctrines
also resonates on a theoretical level the ideas of chaos
and complexity theory.
As opposed to the industrial doctrines, Naveh proposes
a nomadic “rhizomatic manoeuvre”, based on
contemporary war experiences where a high-density
army meets a dispersed and clouded enemy (2006). To
Naveh, the rhizomatic manoeuvre is executed in a
theatre of war with no clear borders or frontiers and
evolves into complex fractal-like geometry rather than
3

tracing Euclidean lines. It defines as its space of praxis a
self-regulating ecology or auto-poietic system which
means that the aim is not to strike deep into enemy
territory (as that has no meaning to the enemy) but
instead to pursue potential, to build possible exploitation
for actors in the environment and to reveal their form to
the other combatants. Like fire ant colonies, if operates
without hierarchy but a force being constantly present
(Naveh 2006).
In today’s complex conflict environments the
engineering or surgical precision of smart bombs is
complementary to the “swarming” tactics of everpresent drones and non-linear operations where the
forces are spread out rather than concentrated (Edwards
2005).
The future of war is fraught with uncertainty.
Among the few points that experts agree on is that
the future battlefield will be relatively empty as
military operations become more dispersed. This is
due to the increasing lethality of weapons, in
particular precision guided munitions (PGMs),
which render concentrations of mass on the
battlefield vulnerable. Long-range fires can now be
delivered by a variety of means because of recent
improvements in command and control and in sensor
technologies. Even direct fire is now much more
lethal. Warfare is becoming a hide-and-seek struggle
where units must remain elusive in order to survive.
(Edwards 2005: 1)
This dispersed battlefield is the opposite of the
industrial paradigm, which could be summed up in
German Blitzkrieg general Heinz Guderian’s quote
“Klotzen, nich Kleckern” (“boot’em, don’t spatter ‘em”
or "strike concentrated, not dispersed”) (Guderian 1996:
316).
Swarm tactics is a response due to the fact that the
weapons of today are more accurate and deadly as well
as a frequent asymmetric tactic by “insurgents” to
counter the superiority of modern conventional forces.
“Swarming involves the convergent action of several
units that continue to attack by dispersing,
manoeuvring, and reinitiating combat (pulsing).”
(Edwards 2005: 68) Yet, swarming is not a classic
guerrilla tactic as engaging and destroying the main
field forces of a conventional army is usually
unattainable by guerrilla tactics alone (Edwards 2005:
65). Likewise, guerrilla tactics usually aim at one attack
to then disperse, while swarming uses “pulsing”
behaviour, with repeated and reiterated pounding of
enemy forces in a continuous flow. In contrast to the old
uncoordinated swarms of the Mongols, who used the
“Mangudai” technique with a simulated retreat of a
weak centre, today’s equivalents are networked and well
informed, both high-tech US forces in Afghanistan as
well as satellite telephone equipped pirates outside
Somalia.
The networked swarms of today form emergent
systems, similar to the Complex Adaptive Systems,
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which is the use mass, iteration and technology to
coordinate and harness complexity (Axelrod & Cohen
1999). This is the type of behaviour we see more
common also in the civil world and especially design
discourse. We see Complex Adaptive Systems in the
use of “smart mobs” (Rheingold 2002), open-source
programming (Raymond 1999), user-driven innovation
(von Hippel 2005) and “crowdsourcing” (Howe 2006).
But it is also common in the activist behaviours of the
“multitude” (Hardt & Negri 2005) or “flash mobs” and
“critical mass” bicycle protests.
The same type of abstract logic can be traced in the
works of industrial designer Hella Jongerius in her
works with porcelain producer Nymphenburg where she
delegated design decisions to the painters who were
“free to choose their own colours and images from the
company’s collection” (Jongerius 2004). Jongerius work
is an excellent example of manoeuvre warfare, moving
control to the front line, and using rhizomatic
manoeuvre to produce non-linear decorative results.

DESIGNING THINKING AT THE FRONTLINE
Clausewitz’ remark that “war is the continuation of
politics with other means” has formed the basis for
conventional war studies over the last century and is
still deeply engraved into the “Clausewitzian culture” of
military thinking (Christiansson 2007: 9). However, as
politics is a many-folded field of practice and discourse
and changes with time, so do the parameters of conflict
and war.
In the “industrial war”, as General Rupert Smith frames
it, war was waged by military experts supported by
complex technocratic systems. Such systems focused on
mobilizing and commanding concentrations of speed
and mass into decisive battles and this was the recurrent
image of future warfare during the Cold War. However,
as Smith points out, “war no longer exists” (Smith 2005:
1). War is no longer fought between two opposed state
machines, but today we see “war amongst the people”
become the dominant form of armed conflict. Such
armed conflicts engage civilian and non-state agents and
makes no mutual distinction between combatants as it
was defined in the Geneva Convention.
Perhaps most importantly, Smith suggests, the armed
conflicts common today has no possibility of reaching a
final victory but must rather end in a tolerable
“condition”. The use of military force can no longer win
by conquering and holding territory but can only
produce the conditions in which acceptable outcomes
can be produced by political and social means. As Smith
points out, “once an intervention has occurred a main
preoccupation is how to leave the territory rather than
keep it.” (Smith 2005: 272) This situation, which in
many ways directly opposes the common lines of
thought about military intervention, creates a lacuna of
conceptual models to understand military action in
contemporary conflict.
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However, as noted by management researcher Roger
Martin, today “design thinking” has become a vital part
of the complex theatre of operations in armed conflict
and is frequently discussed in military journals, for
example Military Review (Martin 2010). One such
design-imbued doctrine is the “operational art” of
Shimon Naveh (2007) and the “systemic operational
design” of Huba Wass de Czege (2009). The latest US
Army Field Manual (FM 5-0) on operations process,
which includes a lot of “design thinking” frames the
problems of contemporary warfare,
As learned in recent conflicts, challenges facing the
commander in operations often can be understood
only in the context of other factors influencing the
population. These other factors often include, but are
not limited to, economic development, governance,
information, tribal influence, religion, history, and
culture. Full spectrum operations conducted among
the population are effective only when commanders
understand the issues in the context of the complex
issues facing the population. Understanding context
and then deciding how, if, and when to act is both a
product of design and integral to the art of
command. (FM 5-0: § 3-17, italics added)
The addition of design thinking into military doctrine is
an attempt to reduce the impact of reductive and
mechanistic thinking within operations planning,
stemming from the industrial paradigm of warfare. The
ultimately goal of design here is to create better military
“conditions”. Military organizations have always been
complicated, that is many part arranged in linear and
predictable ways, but for today’s complex conflicts the
armed forces need to adapt to new environment of
multiple “soft” factors, like culture, tribal alliances, civil
governance etc.
To underline some of the complexity of a battle today, a
US commander’s checklist before a brigade-size
counterattack in Afghanistan can today look like this:
- What infrastructure damage could the
counterattack incur?
- How would that impact on the different actors and
tribal groups in the region?
- Are we creating a disaffected minority by upsetting
the power balance, risking a refugee crisis that
would overwhelm the regional humanitarian
capacity, or create other unintended consequences?
[…]
- What is the logic of the guidance?
- What are the sources of legitimacy of the different
power bases within the enemy’s social system?
(Banach & Ryan 2009: 108)
For acting within such complex operational
environment, Wass de Czege, now retired Brigade
General and founder of the School of Advanced
Military Studies (SAMS) at the U.S. Army War
College, proposes more adaptive learning cycles. These
Nordic Design Research Conference 2011, Helsinki www.nordes.org

adaptive learning cycles, which must be networked into
the interconnected operational environment, coordinates
a wide variety of decisions and units (Wass de Czege
2009) and there is called upon an associative “art of
design” (Banach & Ryan 2009; Hernández 2010).
In this type of complex environment it might not be of
surprise to notice how Naveh and the Israeli Defence
Forces has had Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand
Plateaus as his references, and also other theorists;
We are like the Jesuit Order. We attempt to teach
and train soldiers to think. […] We read Christopher
Alexander, can you imagine?; we read John
Forester, and other architects. We are reading
Gregory Bateson; we are reading Clifford Geertz.
Not myself, but our soldiers, our generals are
reflecting on these kinds of materials. We have
established a school and developed a curriculum that
trains “operational architects”. (Naveh cited in
Weizman 2006)
More notably to the design community, distinguished
theorist are also among the writers used for war today,
with names like Buchanan, Krippendorf, Margolin,
Simon, Thackara and Papanek, not to mention the
Gothenburg-based management theorist Barbara
Czarniawska (Naveh 2007).
What these theorists offer are new ways to
conceptualize war, how to form doctrine, perhaps most
importantly; were do disband doctrine to form new
diagrams of thinking (Weizman 2006). Here the
connection between design and warfare comes to its
clearest; in ways to conceptualize the future in
simulation, scenarios, prototypes and games for
training.

PROTOTYPING WAR FOR NEW TACTICAL
DIMENSIONS
The Prussian king Frederick the Great was fascinated
with automatons, representing his meticulously ordered
clockwork armies, as Michel Foucault (1991) and
Manuel DeLanda (1991) both elaborate on. But as they
both highlight, he was also very fond of miniature war
games. Later, during the reign of Fredrik William III,
war games, or Kriegsspiel, were developed by the
Prussian general staff into a ubiquitous tool for officer
education and strategy, and such games also later
became war games for the gentry. An example could be
the popular game Stratego, launched in France in 1908
as “L’attaque” a strategy game building on the “fog-ofwar”, as the opponents pieces are hidden for the players.
(Deterling 2008: 100) One famous civil proponent of
more figure-like and playful games was British science
fiction writer H.G. Wells, wrote two epic books on the
matter, Floor Games (1911) and Little Wars (1913), and
is considered the “father of miniature war gaming”
(Wells 1977: 91).
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Also the protagonist of situationism, Guy Debord, was a
devoted war gamer. During the foundation of the
situationist movement he developed the game Le Jeu de
la Guerre (Game of War), invented in 1965 but first
published in 1987, which he later exemplified as his key
study in the “logic of war” (Debord 2005: 55). Debord’s
Game of War exposes certain diagrams of the strategic
possibilities in Napoleonic warfare, but the game also
acts as a bastard sibling to chess, perhaps the prime
strategic war game. It is not a coincidence that Debord
developed a strategic game. Giorgio Agamben said
about Debord; “once, when I was tempted (as I still am)
to consider Guy Debord a philosopher, he told me: ‘I’m
not a philosopher, I’m a strategist.’ Debord saw his time
as an incessant war, which engaged his entire life in a
strategy.” (Agamben cited in Wark 2008: 28) Media
theorist Wark continues in his analysis of Debord’s
relation to the game;
The strategist is not the proprietor of a field of
knowledge, but rather assesses the value of the
forces aligned on any available territory. The
strategist occupies, evacuates, or contests any
territory on pursuit of advantage. (Wark 2008: 28)
Here, the game of Debord reveals perhaps not only a
matter of war or armed conflict but of how conceptual
thinking and prototyping comes to define patterns of
logics or “abstract machines”.
Also art groups proposed games to cut the stalemate of
rigid thinking, perhaps most vividly the Surrealists
(Brotchie 1991). Marcel Duchamp gave up art, carved
himself a chess set from wood, and spent the rest of his
life concerned with chess. He later wrote a book about
chess. Duchamp meant,
The chess pieces are the block alphabet which
shapes thoughts; and these thoughts, although
making a visual design on the chess-board, express
their beauty abstractly, like a poem.... I have come to
the personal conclusion that while all artists are not
chess players, all chess players are artists. (Duchamp
quoted in d'Harnoncourt & McShine 1973: 131)
The Bauhaus teacher Josef Hartwig produced a series of
updated cubist chess sets between 1922-24 as
prototypes of the rational thinking of the modern times
envisioned at the Bauhaus. Also here, chess was a game
to conceptualize deeper logics of society and the
machine age. Fascinated by the robotic moves of the
pieces (also reflected in Oscar Schlemmer’s Bauhaus
theatre), Hartwig’s chess set “embodies a utopian quest
for the new subject to be self-determining in ludic and
linguistic culture.” (Buchloh 2009: 148)
In his renowned study of everyday life, Michel de
Certeau also strives to reveal the logics behind the
practices of the everyday through abstract logics he calls
“strategies” and “tactics” (Certeau 1988; 1998). Certeau
links strategies with institutions and structures of power
which produce the environments of the everyday. On
the other side he puts the tactics of individuals
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consumers acting and “making do” in the environments
defined by strategies, reverting and undermining them
by creating own meanings. In his example of walking
through the city, the pedestrian takes tactical shortcuts
instead of following the strategic grid system. Indeed, to
Certeau, the everyday is made up of tactical “social
games” and the carnival, where spectators are actors at
the same time, is a common tactic for reclaiming the
everyday. (Certeau 1998: 33) Like the Hutier storm
troopers, appropriating the enemy’s communication
lines as scenes for battle, Certeau’s everyday people
fight to misuse the strategic system in order to produce
possible futures.
Certeau’s tactics, the Kriegsspiele of the general staff,
and the civil games examined above are the equivalent
of the scenarios and prototypes of designers. They
propose “what-if” course of events and settings that are
aimed at informing new practices and provoke new
thinking about the possible as well as the impossible. As
argued by design theorist John Wood, the scenarios of
designers facilitate discussions and visualizes proposals
about the possible, thus aiming to inspire and render
new worlds attainable, or denounceable (Wood 2007).
This “design for micro-utopias” is the tactical thinking
of design, to prototype future scenarios and thinking the
new. The designer’s training, to visualize and abstract
the possible new, is a core element of the highly
desirable “design thinking” which is now seeping into
military operational planning. This is especially
apparent in the operational parts which are dependent on
the “tactics” of civilian intelligence and cooperation;
counterinsurgency.

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SOCIALLY
ENGAGED WARFARE
Breaking the moral of enemy units has always been an
important part of warfare. From war painted faces to
propaganda, and from whistling arrows to sirens at divebombers. Psychological Operations, Psy-ops, have
strived at affecting military personnel as well as
civilians.
In recent years, as the US Army has been engaged in
complex overseas missions of counterinsurgency, there
has been a call for the education of more “culturally
literate soldiers” to further the building of trust with
local inhabitants (McFarland 2005). As a quick response
to this urge, the US has created a system of embedded
anthropologists in their combat units to better
understand the “human terrain” of the conflicts. The
teams are multi-disciplinary research groups of two
anthropologists and three military personnel and are
trained to gather cultural intelligence from the theatre of
operations. Starting in 2006, the teams go through a
short military training at the Human Terrain System
centre in the US before being deployed in combat
theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq. Such teams of
academics from the social sciences are supposed to be
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similar to police community outreach programs,
mediating in conflicts, enabling the development of
governance and supporting the goals of the military
engagement.
The Human Terrain System uses empirical sociocultural research and analysis to fill a large
operational decision-making support gap. This
research provides current, accurate, and reliable data
generated by on-the-ground research on the specific
social groups in the supported unit’s operating
environment. This human terrain knowledge
provides a socio-cultural foundation for the staff’s
support to the Commander’s Military Decision
Making Process. (Human Terrain System)
The US Army now has “Human Terrain Teams” in each
of its deployed 26 combat brigades in Iraq and
Afghanistan to help provide commanders with a sense
of cultural understanding when making decisions.
Critics have questioned the ethical practices of
embedded civilians for research and called this
development “mercenary anthropology” that exploits
social science for political gain by means of violence (cf
Rodhe 2007, Gonzalez 2009, Lucas 2009).
Anthropologists have been sceptical of the ethical
responsibilities of researchers, questions of secrecy,
voluntary informed consent, adequate training and
misuse of data. Resistance is also met from inside the
military, where the teams are seen as merely a quick fix
that obstructs the repair of a wider gap of cultural terrain
training (Connable 2009). Others, like David Kilcullen,
an Australian anthropologist focused on
counterinsurgency and architect of the Human Terrain
Teams strategy, calls the program positively “armed
social work.” Kilcullen further argues,
Conflict ethnography is key; to borrow a literary
term, there is no substitute for a "close reading" of
the environment. But it is a reading that resides in no
book, but around you; in the terrain, the people, their
social and cultural institutions, the way they act and
think. You have to be a participant observer.
(Kilcullen 2007)
The argumentations in this critical crossfire sound much
like the discussions surrounding participatory design in
the 80s and especially the current “design doctrine” of
social design. Where Kilcullen argues that current wars
are “population-centric”, and the military thus needs to
control the people, it may seem like to design for “the
other 90%” (Smith 2007) or “like you give a damn”
(Sinclair 2006) might be some of the best tactics to
wage war with the “soft power” favoured by president
Barack Obama.
One critique of the Human Terrain Teams is that they
are not hired by the Army per se, but through
subcontractors like BAE Systems and thus managed in
military-commercial settings (Gonzalez 2008).
Similarly, social design might become a new “surrogate
warfare”, where hired locals become engaged in
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military operations, paid by external interests which
might not share the same ethical values. Beyond the
hype of “socially engaged practices” the design field
taking on outspoken social issues in complex human
terrain is doomed to step into imperialist footsteps, as
commented by Bruce Nussbaum in his article which
triggered the hot debate in summer 2010: “Are
designers the new anthropologists or missionaries, come
to poke into village life, "understand" it and make it
better--their "modern" way?” (Nussbaum 2010). In
Pilloton’s response to Nussbaum she highlights local
connectedness as a key component of success, not too
dissimilar to what the Human Terrain teams are after, or
the tactics of “surrogate warfare”. However, to save the
day, Pilloton enthusiastically lifts forward the social
salvation of creativity;
This is the power of humanitarian design: When it's
not about design anymore, it's about an educational
process that produces creative capital where it did
not exist before, in beautiful ways, by
underestimated individuals. (Pilloton 2010)
As earlier highlighted by Forty, design has a tacit
tradition of politicized capital, control through
standardization, and commercialization through
modernist utopianism (Forty 1986). Today, perhaps the
greatest imperialist endeavour of design is to fuel the
arms race through the “creative imperative” and tacit
complicity with creative capital, as this is considered
essential for survival in the current labour, attentiveness
and relations markets in service of the creative
industries (von Osten 2002). Likewise, “social
innovation”, facilitated by flown in designers or local
educators, might have its merits, but it also an effective
tool at hand for the surrogate warfare of creative capital.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED FURTHER
RESEARCH
Design and warfare has been intertwined as long as man
has made weapons. Just like the ethical discussions that
have lately concerned anthropologists about the Human
Terrain System, design needs to examine the ethics,
methods, tools and consequences of socially engaged
practices. What ethical principles should be employed
when discussing social design, and what role does
guidelines from, for example, the UN play?
Further research could take as point of departure the
discussions concerning the Human Terrain Teams, as
well as discussions from development studies, and
reflect onto some case studies of social design projects.
However, avoiding cynicism can a tough task in the
design world, as imperialism, power, creative capital,
cognitive globalization and design blur into each other.
Just like civil engineers set out to differentiate from
military engineers about a century ago, we might one
day need to start considering to make demarcations
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between civil social design as distinct from military
social design. But is this where we want to go?
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